Anurupa – Page 9 – Anurupa Cinar

The Pakistan plant grows and grows . . .

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“A deed without a name . . .”

“And thus I clothe my naked villainy

With odd old ends stolen out of holy writ;

And seem a saint, when most I play the devil.”

― William Shakespeare, Richard III

Hi, Everyone! Gandhi crossed all limits when he went personally to Jinnah and tried to bring him round to his way of thinking for three weeks.

But Jinnah was a wily bird, and more than a match for Gandhi’s scheming!

“The lengthy correspondence and prolonged talks between Gandhi and Jinnah took place for three weeks. Gandhi paid nineteen visits to Jinnah without receiving a single one in return, even observed his usual silence on Sundays and returned everyday with an unpleasant face from there! Yet Jinnah gained much. He got the Congress moral leader committed to the principle of the division of India. On September 24 Gandhi wrote to Jinnah: ‘If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that those areas shall form a separate State as soon as India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two Sovereign Independent States.’

Gandhi had declared on several occasions that Pakistan was a sin, a denial of God and an untruth. He had asked the protagonists of Pakistan to vivisect him before they vivisected India. But now he conceded the principle of vivisection of India and to undo the work of centuries.”[1]

But Jinnah didn’t seem to be budging, so Gandhi went further.

“Immediately on the acceptance of that agreement by the Congress and the League, the two would decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of India’s independence. The League would however be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress might resort and in which it might not be willing to participate.”[2]

The Mahatma of the Indians himself had publicly conceded Pakistan to Jinnah’s demands. In fact he was practically pushing it on him!

But Jinnah was no fool. He knew well that it was the British who had the power to grant his demands; all he needed was a concrete public acceptance of Pakistan from the Mahatma (which, but naturally, meant the acquiescence of the Congress.)

· And that goal was now achieved.

Jinnah didn’t need to agree to a thing!

“On September 27, Jinnah announced that it had not been possible to reach an agreement, but added: ‘We trust that this is not the final end of our efforts.’ Gandhiji commented that failure to reach an agreement was no cause for disappointment. ‘The breakdown is only so called. It is an adjournment sine die.’”[3]

As V. P. Menon write in his Transfer of Power (page 163):

“In these circumstances Gandhiji’s move was calculated only to strengthen Jinnah’s hands and further the cause of the Muslim League.”

What would be Gandhi’s next move?

Anurupa

[1]Mahatma Gandhi, Keer, page 727.

[2]Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 165.

[3]Adjournment sine die from the Latin “without day,” meaning “without assigning a day for a further meeting or hearing.

The Pakistan Plant takes firm root . . .

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“A deed without a name . . .”

“It’s better to have a thousand enemies outside of the tent than one inside the tent.”

Hi, Everyone! In 1943, this is how the position stands:

“In 1939, when the war broke out, Jinnah could claim only a nominal hold on the Punjab. But by this time all the other provinces which he claimed for Pakistan, namely Assam, Sind, Bengal, and the North-West Frontier Province, had come under the control of League ministries.”[1]

Jinnah and the Muslim League were in a very strong position, both with the British and the Muslims in India.

On an aside, I want to mention that Savarkar, too, had against all odds developed the Hindu Mahasabha into a party of some standing. I shall post on Savarkar separately at a later date.

The Congress was not in a very good position politically. It is at this time Nehru was indiscreet enough to record his frustrations in his diary.

Nehru wrote in his jail diary on December 28, 1943: “Instinctively I think it is better to have Pakistan or almost nothing if only to keep Jinnah far away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from (sic) interfering continually in India’s progress”[2]

Yes, most certainly, the Pakistan scheme had become most attractive to the Congress High Command!

Rajgopalachari (Rajaji) had been heavily promoting the Pakistan scheme everywhere. He had been corresponding with Jinnah over it too.

“It should be noted here that Rajgopalachari met Gandhi in the Aga Khan palace during his fast and he [Gandhi] blessed the scheme adopted by Rajagopalachari. Soon after Rajagopalachari offered it to Jinnah who did not pay much attention to it at this stage, in April 1943. . . .

The crafty politician, Rajagopalachari, kept Gandhi’s approval of his scheme a secret. Neither did the Mahatma reveal it to anybody. He was conceiving Pakistan.”[3]

How shocking that the Mahatma of the Indians who publicly swore the vivisection of India was a sin, should secretly plot to commit this sin himself . . . ! How very many of the Mahatma’s lofty principles are sacrificed in this one act.

By 1944, the whole ugly story was spilled out into the open by all three main participants: Gandhi, Rajaji, and Jinnah.

“‘In one of his telegrams sent to Mr. Jinnah and now released to the press, Rajaji said, ‘Mr. Gandhi, though not vested with representative or special capacity in this matter, definitely approved of my proposals and authorized me to approach you on that basis. The weight of his opinion would most probably secure Congress acceptance.’

Mark the secret promise of the truth-seeker, Gandhi, who abhorred secrecy in any matter. Read this further confession of Rajaji in his statement of July 16, 1944, issued from Panchgani in which he said: ‘It is now two years since I started work, even though I had secured Gandhi’s unqualified support to the scheme and it conceded all that the Muslim League had ever demanded in its resolution of 1940.’ Mark the words ‘two years.’”[4]

That would make it 1942 as the year this secret pact was made between Gandhi and Rajaji—the year that Gandhi launched the Quit India Movement.

In 1944, the Congress desperation to gain control in India—and not getting anywhere with either Jinnah or the Viceroy—led Gandhi to come right out in the open. The duped Indians should not have remained duped anymore!

What were Gandhi’s concessions to Jinnah and the Viceroy? Read on:

“Gandhi gave an interview in the first week of July to Stuart Gelder of the News Chronicle, London . . . the interview was published in The Times of India of July 11. On the previous day The Times of India had published a statement issued by Rajagopalachari in which he had said: ‘The public will note from the correspondence now published that I had secured Gandhiji’s personal approval even during his fast in February-March last year for the formula I am releasing.’. . .

In his interviews Gandhi told Stuart Gelder that he had no intention of offering civil disobedience. It was his purpose not to hinder but help the war effort. . . . He would be satisfied with a national Government in full control of the civil administration . . . He also said he had approved the proposals submitted to Jinnah by Rajagopalachari, if the Muslim League would endorse the demand for independence.

He further said that he regarded the Rajaji formula as being consistent with national integrity and his own opinion with the spirit of the Congress resolution. . . .

Commenting on this, ‘Candidus’ observed in The Times of India: ‘The past week also witnessed the revelation that Mr. Gandhi, who a couple of years ago was stoutly opposed to a division of the country, is now agreeable to the principle of Pakistan. It is a reversal of his original approach that partition of India would be a ‘sin’. He now concedes the principle of Pakistan, division of India.’”[5]

This bold move on the part of Gandhi was a shock to the Congress members, but quite in keeping with Gandhi’s frequent claims of “carrying the Congress with himself,” they did nothing to oppose.

“When the scheme was out, there was a flutter for a while among the Congress circles and press; but they were stunned to see that their holy father Gandhi was acting as the Godfather to the unholy scheme of portioning their Motherland and thereafter they culpably kept silent on the nefarious move.”[6]

Gandhi’s next move was to actually have long “talks” with Jinnah to concede Pakistan to him.

All that glitters is not gold . . .

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“In every age it has been the tyrant, the oppressor and the exploiter who has wrapped himself in the cloak of patriotism, or religion, or both to deceive and overawe the People.”

– Eugene Victor Debs

Hi, Everyone! While the Congress Working Committee was busy getting its Pakistan resolution passed, what was Gandhi saying?

“‘I consider,’ Gandhi declared in Harijan of May 24, 1942, ‘the vivisection of India to be a sin.’

In Harijan of May 31, 1942, he said: “No third party should decide our fate. It should be reason or the sword.” And he had already said that “if I can carry the Congress with me, I would not put the Muslims to the trouble of using force.”

One has already seen how indeed the Mahatma of the Indians carried—by hook or by crook—the Congress with him!! Check out below what he had written to Jinnah on the very day he launched the Quit India Movement!

“On August 8, 1942, he had written to Jinnah and to a Muslim businessman in Bombay that he had no objection to Britain handing over power to the Muslim League subject to certain provisos.”[1]

In addition, his mouthpiece, Rajagopalachari, was encouraging the idea of accepting Pakistan among the people.

“The fact was that Rajagopalachari was doing his utmost by his propaganda to enable the Muslim League to translate Gandhi’s proposition into action.”[2]

As it wasn’t enough that the Pakistan scheme was being heavily promoted by the Congress, their “Quit India” challenge to the British was not at all what it appeared on the surface is either!

Britain must “Quit India” but leave behind her army . . . ! Can one call that “independence”?

“But this was a strange solution. It implied that the civil Government would be in the hands of Indians, and there would be some form of British military rule over India, a remedy worse than the disease,” writes Keer in his biography of Gandhi (page 704,) adding:

“It was given to Rajgopalachari again to expose the fallacy in Gandhi’s stand. In a letter to Gandhi Rajagopalachari said: ‘Your proposal that while the civil power may be withdrawn the British and Allied forces may continue in India in anticipation of a treaty with a problematical provisional Indian Government will only lead to the exercise of all Government functions by military forces. This will happen if only for their own safety and effective functioning. They are further likely to be urged towards this step by local chieftains and suffering people. This would be the reinstallation of the British Government in the worst form.’”[3]

Today, almost everywhere, Quit India Movement is touted as a wonderful call by Gandhi for the freedom of India.

· Can promoting the Pakistan scheme and keeping British military rule be an agenda of any true call of freedom for India?

No.

Why then is the Truth forced to wear this mask?

Have people lost the ability to look beyond the hollow words of propaganda?

Anurupa

[1] Ibid, page 708.

[2] Mahatma Gandhi, Keer, page 701

[3] Ibid, page 704.

The Machiavellian Scheme . . .

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“Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are.”

― Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince

“How easy it is, treachery. You just slide into it.”

-Margaret Atwood, The Year of the Flood

Hi, Everyone! The Congress Working Committee resolution acceding Pakistan reigned supreme—as affirmed by the Congress dictators on August 6, 1942.

Note the date:August 6, 1942. Quit India Movement was launched on August 8, 1942.

Quit India was a most hollow, doomed-for-failure Movement—but the Congress High Command must surely not have known that? They must have expected to gain some form of independence.

· Hence their rush to pass the Pakistan resolution . . . ?

· Had India (in the most unlikely chance) gained independence then, Congress had paved the way to hack India into pieces in 1942 . . . !

There was also an interesting factor exposed in the United India resolution:

“Another revealing feature of the Akhand Hindustan [united India, made by the A.I.C.C.] resolution was that all the Muslim members of the A.I.C.C. opposed it in the Allahbad meeting of the A.I.C.C. and issued a joint statement in regard to it.”[1]

Note that all the Muslim members of the All-India Congress Committee—just like their High Command—were in favor of Pakistan too!

And they, along with a significant number of other Muslims who voted for the Muslim League, did not move bag-and-baggage to Pakistan after partition.

They, the Hindu-Muslim problem, and an Indian Muslim League party remained behind in India even after Partition . . . !

Just a thought: What exactly did India achieve by partition?

· Was the Hindu-Muslim problem solved? No.

· Did the violence end? No.

· Did Congress have free rein? Yes.

Anurupa

[1]Mahatma Gandhi, Keer, page 700.

Nurturing of the Pakistan Plant

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“Judge not by the glib words spoken with a forked tongue, judge by the actions that follow them.”

– Anurupa Cinar

Hi, Everyone! In March 1940, the Muslim League made a formal demand for Pakistan. And by May 1940, Gandhi started talking with a forked tongue!

While researching Gandhi I have noticed he has a remarkable talent for expressing two opposing ideas and making them seem reasonable. The unpleasant point is made in a negative form and the one intended to be applauded, quoted, and publicized is made very positively.

I am giving a prime example of it below:

“‘As a man of nonviolence,’ he [Gandhi] observed, ‘I cannot forcibly resist the proposed partition if the Muslims of India really insist upon it.’”

That’s the negative form, and a euphemistic way of really saying he will accept Pakistan—for the Muslims in India were most certainly insisting upon it . . . !

In the next sentence he says:

“But I can never be a willing party to the vivisection. . . .”[1]

How very much this sentence been quoted . . . ! Though, even in that there is a catch, for he can claim to be an “unwilling” party to the vivisection. There’s his out.

See how it is? I intend to devote a whole post one day to highlighting many of Gandhi’s such double-talk.

Congress was certainly wishing to get rid of Jinnah. Pakistan plan was insidiously being spoken off in an agreeable way. Check out what Gandhi has to say— openly published in his Harijan —to an Englishman.

“While answering an Englishman, Gandhi replied in Harijan of May 4, 1940: ‘I would any day prefer Muslim rule to British rule. . . . The partition proposal had altered the face of Hindu-Muslim problem. . . .’ And he granted that “Pakistan cannot be worse than foreign domination.’”

And Keer further asks, as a comment on this flimflaming of Gandhi’s:

“Was it an explanation of his stand or a direction for the Muslim leaders to draw up their plans?”[2]

By 1942, Congress was done with these oblique references to accepting Pakistan. Jinnah and the Muslim League were becoming a big hindrance in their path. Viceroy Linlithgow was not entertaining their demands, especially ones that aimed at giving Congress sole power in free India. The Congress High Command now made a drastic, treacherous move.

“The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress proclaimed emphatically by a resolution at Delhi in April 1942, ‘that the Congress could not think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to join the Indian Union against their declared and established will.’

This historic resolution brought into bold relief the fact that the Congress favoured the provinces with the right of self-determination or secession and such secession was called by the Muslims ‘Pakistan.’

Dealing with Congress resolution four years later, Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya had to admit: ‘It is evident that the passage concedes the division of India into more than one State and gives the go-by to the Unity and integrity of India.’”[3]

Pakistan resolution was now passed by the Congress Working Committee . . . ! And that in April 1942—five years before Partition and independence.

The All-India Congress Committee, though, was as yet clueless re this treacherous resolution of their Working Committee.

Now the Congress High Command had to ensure that the A.I.C.C. too accepted the Pakistan resolution. Rajagopalachari set to work to do the deed.

“On 23April 1942 Rajagopalachari managed to get two resolutions passed by the Congress members in the Madras legislature. The first recommended to the All-India Congress Committee (which was about to meet in Allahbad) that Congressmen should acknowledge the Muslim League’s claim for separation, should the same be persisted in when the time came for framing the constitution of India . . . The resolution urged that ‘to sacrifice the chances of the formation of a national government for the doubtful advantage of maintaining a controversy over the unity of India is the most unwise policy’ and that it had become necessary to choose the lesser evil. . . .

The Muslim League was naturally jubilant at its ideal of Pakistan having been brought down at last from the clouds of speculation to the level of practical politics . . .

The All-India Congress Committee, meeting in Allahabad on 29 April, rejected his resolution by an overwhelming majority and adopted a counter-resolution ‘that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.’”[4]

The Congress members were not in favor of their High Command’s sellout of the Motherland. They stated so, unequivocally in their resolution.

But the Congress High Command who were absolute dictators of the Congress (and had disregarded, overturned, and schemed against relatively minor issues) were not about to let their Delhi resolution of acceding Pakistan, upon which depended their getting total power in free India (or so they believed,) be swept away.

“Upon this Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad asked Maulana Azad whether Jagat Narayan’s resolution had in any way modified or affected the Delhi resolution of the Working Committee. Maulana Azad in his letter of August 6, 1942, replied: ‘No part of the Delhi resolution to which you refer has in any way been affected or modified by any subsequent resolution of the A.I.C.C.’”

“To the same question of Dr. Latif, Jawaharlal Nehru also replied that Babu Jagat Narayan’s ‘resolution does not in any way override the Delhi Working Committee resolution.’”^{^[5]}

· So the Congress Working Committee resolution acceding Pakistan reigned supreme—as affirmed by the Congress dictators on August 6, 1942.

Read on to discover the Machiavellian timing of this Delhi resolution . . .

Anurupa

[1] Mahatma Gandhi, Dhananjay Keer, Page 682.

[2] Mahatma Gandhi, Dhananjay Keer, Page 682-683.

[3] Veer Savarkar, Dhananjay Keer, page 307.

[4]Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 139.

[5]Mahatma Gandhi, Keer, page 700.

The Turning Point . . .

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“History is not the story of heroes entirely. It is often the story of cruelty and injustice and shortsightedness. There are monsters, there is evil, there is betrayal.”

– David C. McCullough

Hi, Everyone! By 1939, WWII was well under way. With the Muslims making up the bulk of the army, the Viceroy was going to keep them happy.

Jinnah himself had astutely perceived this.

“Jinnah remarked later [after September 4, 1939, meeting], ‘After the war . . . suddenly there came a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr. Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr. Gandhi.’”[1]

“In the Viceroy’s view, it remained as important as ever to give the fullest weight to the Muslim position at a time when their assistance and support were so essential to His Majesty’s Government, both from the military point of view (they were providing 60 percent of the army) and because of possible reactions in other countries.”[2]

But the Congress was in a strong position with the Viceroy as well. Viceroy Linlithgow was really walking a tightrope politically.

· With the Congress running eight of the eleven Provincial governments, the Viceroy was not going to upset them. This was the time to use bargaining power wisely.

· Unfortunately, the Congress High Command simply had no political acumen! And so proceeded to lose the only political advantage they had.

The Congress was demanding that “India must be declared an independent nation and present application must be given to this status to the largest possible extent.”

There wasn’t any way the British were going to focus on leaving India (even had they wanted to) when they were desperately trying to save their own skin and freedom from Hitler . . . !^{^[3]}

“The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, issued a statement on 17 October, 1939. He reiterated that Dominion Status was the goal of British policy, but pointed out that for the present the Act of 1935 held the field. . . .

The Congress Working Committee regarded the Viceroy’s statement as ‘an unequivocal reiteration of the imperialist policy’ and therefore declared itself unable to give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialistic policy, which it has always sought to end. As a first step in this direction the Committee called upon the Congress Ministers to resign. All the Congress Ministries accordingly resigned beween 27 October and 15 November, 1939.

Both the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, and the Viceroy tried to win over the Congress leaders by granting more powers to Indians in the administration.

But the Congress ‘declined to consider any steps to further co-operation’ unless the British Government clearly declared its policy in favour of Indian independence, and demanded the appointment of a Constituent Assembly. . . .”

Here was a great opportunity lost by the Congress short-sightedness! Surely, this was the time to hang in there, especially with more powers being given?

· Is there ever anything to gain by resigning and taking oneself off the scene?

The Congress strategy to resign from ministries and disrupt the functioning of the Provinces failed—one more time! They did not learn from their mistakes.

To continue:

“The Viceroy felt relieved by the resignation of Congress Ministeries, for they controlled eight out of the eleven Provinces and so had power to impair war-efforts of the Government. As the eight Provinces were now being ruled by the Governors, there was no longer any need to placate the Congress, and the Viceroy canvassed the support of the Muslim League.

This considerably strengthened the position of the League and it was joined by the waverers among the Muslims. In March, 1940, the Muslim League, at its Lahore Session, made a formal demand for a separate Muslim State.”[4]

With increased influence with the Viceroy of the Muslim League, the Pakistan demand was now formally made . . . !—a direct cause-and-effect of the Congress misguided decision to resign from their provincial ministeries.

· Jinnah was not one to let grass grow beneath his feet!

“The decision of the Congress to resign was widely regretted. Even within the Congress there were some who were opposed to this course. We shall see, as we proceed, how it only weakened the bargaining power of the Congress. . . .

At the start Lord Linlithgow had recognized that he could not leave the Congress out of his reckoning. It was not only the largest and most important political party in the country; it was at the time responsible for the government of eight of the eleven provinces, and so had within its power seriously to impair the Government’s capacity to prosecute the war effort. When, however, the Congress resigned office, Lord Linlithgow’s attitude automatically changed. There was no longer any necessity to woo the Congress . .

From now on, Lord Linlithgow began to lean more on the support of the Muslim League and to discountenance any move on the part of the Congress to return to office except on his own terms. . . .

With the Congress in wilderness and Jinnah’s hand considerably strengthened, waverers among the Muslims began trickling into the League. For all practical purposes Jinnah was given a veto on further constitutional progress and, Jinnah adroit politician that he was, he made the very most of the situation.”[5]

There! Not only had the Congress put themselves outside the political pale, their asininity in doing so led directly to a strong Muslim League making a formal Pakistan demand!

· This is inexcusable.

· And to counteract their own political blunders and to rid themselves of Jinnah and the League, they began (as we shall see in later posts) to push the Pakistan scheme themselves . . . !

Anurupa

[1]Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 59.

[2]Ibid, page 87.

[3]“If the Congress leaders had only discussed the details of the reconstitution of the Executive council, it is possible that the Viceroy would have gone more than half to way meet the Congress. In the wartime there was no question of converting the Executive Council into a national government. Lord Linlithgow was firm on this issue and so was His Majesty’s Government. Had the Congress joined the Viceroy’s Executive Council at this time, and with Congress ministries coming back into power in the provinces, the political situation would have changed immensely to the advantage of the Congress. Once the Congress rejected the offer the Viceroy was in no mood to carry on any further parleys with it.” Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 97.

[4]HFMI, vol III, R. C. Majumdar, pages 598-600.

[5] Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon. Page 68

Whither Congress . . . ?

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“Those who seek power are not to be trusted with it.”

Hi, Everyone! In 1939, with the WWII well under way, Viceroy Linlithgow was trying to keep all parties of India happy. He met fifty-two leaders of the various parties of India as a “thorough way of hearing a cross-section of opinion at a vital moment.” He was also thinking along the lines of having an all-party meeting in an attempt to ease the situation toward making the Central Federation work and getting cooperation for his war efforts.

He first met the Congress leaders, one by one. With the Congress controlling eight out of the eleven provinces and being such a powerful party of India, their cooperation was essential.

What did the Congress High Command do?

They angled for total control at the center and threatened resigning from the ministries and boycotting of the all-party meeting as a way of twisting the Viceroy’s arm.

Here is how the meeting between Gandhi and the Viceroy proceeded.

“Gandhi then asked the Viceroy for a declaration by Government of what he called ‘a really satisfying kind: Congress were in a special position and could alone achieve results.’ He wanted a declaration of British intentions and an arrangement by which Congress could share power at the Centre with the Government”[1]

The Viceroy was not going to entertain the Congress demand for total control at the center! He needed the Muslim cooperation much too much for that. The army—so critical for running the Empire and Britain’s war efforts—was made up mostly of Muslims. But the Congress never grasped that, they still set themself against the Central Federation since their demands were not being met.

“The Viceroy pointed out that the essential preliminary to such a government was that measure of agreement between parties, communities and interests which he had been so anxious to foster, but to which the excessive claims and the totalitarian ambitions of the Congress and its leaders had been so consistently an obstacle.”[2]

“‘I [Linlithgow] was bound to remind him [Gandhi] that to most thinking men they appeared to make the attainment of Dominion Status, or of complete self-government difficult to a degree, if not wholly impossible at this stage.’. . .

The Viceroy said that he had been thinking of all possible ways of easing the situation. He had thought of an All-parties meeting.”[3]

But the Congress High Command were unanimous in their stand against an All-Party meeting. For them it was Congress and only Congress who should be considered in the politics of India.

“Gandhi thought that an All-Parties conference should be avoided at all costs. . . .

As for an All-Parties Conference, he [Rajendra Prasad] was resolutely against the idea. . .

Nehru, too, was against an All-Parties Conference, which both he and Prasad thought the Congress would boycott.”[4]

Here was the stand Jinnah took:

“Jinnah did not like the idea of a declaration as it would only increase communal tension. He saw no chance of unity unless Congress gave up the claim to speak on behalf of all parties and recognized the Muslim League as spokesman for the Muslims.”[5]

Status quo was maintained. Congress wanting to be the only party in Indian politics, Jinnah most determined that that will not happen. He wanted the Muslim League to be the only party to represent the Muslims.

So what happened next? Find out tomorrow.

Anurupa

[1] The Viceroy at Bay, John Glendevon, page 142.

[2]Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, page 148.

[3] The Viceroy at Bay, John Glendevon, page 143.

[4] The Viceroy at Bay, John Glendevon, page 144-147.

[5] The Viceroy at Bay, John Glendevon, page 150.

The seeds of Pakistan now planted in 1938!

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Mother India: “By the pricking of my thumbs,

Something wicked this way comes.”

Hi, Everyone! In 1937, the Congress had prodded the beast in Jinnah by arrogantly demanding dissolution of the Muslim League and by dangling the carrot of political power—only available by joining the Congress, they implied—before the Muslims.

Jinnah, filled with hatred and suspicion of the Congress, Gandhi, and Nehru, retaliated with a master-stroke reducing the Congress to a “Hindu” party in effect.

How Gandhi and Nehru must have wished he would just go poof!

· But since the “bogey” Jinnah could not be made to go poof, they sought to be rid of him through partition.

Nehru’s words in his diary illuminate this quite clearly. On December 28, 1943, he writes:

“Instinctively I think it is better to have Pakistan or almost nothing if only to keep Jinnah far away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from (sic) interfering continually in India’s progress.”

The axe ready to chop India had even now, in 1938, made its grim appearance on the political scene!

Let us see the how the first seed of Pakistan was planted.

The Government of India Act of 1935 required that a Central Federation be formed. Viceroy Linlithgow was avidly seeking to form this Federation.

But the Congress had set itself against the Federation and did its very best to hamper the Viceroy’s attempts to form this Federation in every possible way.

Surely, forming a Central Federation—one that united all the Provinces and the Princely States—was extremely desirable? Would it not have nipped any thought of partition in the bud?

Instead the Congress chose to oppose it. And not just oppose, Birla, one of Gandhi’s mouthpieces to the Viceroy, put an unbelievable proposal before the Viceroy!

“Birla said that the communal position in India was getting rapidly worse. Congress was aware of it and its leaders were deeply anxious. He then suggested that the best course might be to let the Muslims have their Federation of the North-West. This astonished Linlithgow, who thought at first that Birla was teasing him. When he saw that the suggestion was serious he asked Birla whether he envisaged the perpetuation of British military power to keep peace between Muslim and Hindu Federation . . .

This was a most interesting conversation. It showed clearly Linlithgow’s dread of partition and therefore his shock at encouragement for it coming from a Hindu.”[1]

This conversation has taken place in 1938. Let the truth not escape anyone:

· “Muslim Federation of the North-West”: what is that but another name for Pakistan?

· A demand for a separate Hindu and Muslim Federation in private and the public face . . . ? A vociferous demand for Hindu-Muslim unity . . . !

Yes indeed, the seed of Pakistan has now been planted, on the soil that was tilled in 1937.

Anurupa

[1] Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s biography, The Viceroy at Bay, by John Glendevon, page 88.

The seeds of Pakistan . . . ! (Part II)

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Mother India: “By the pricking of my thumbs,

Something wicked this way comes.”

Hi, Everyone! The period 1937 to 1938 was crucial in Indian Freedom Movement history. It is at this time that the Congress ambitions—of acquiring total control in governing India—became crystal clear, not to the poor gullible Indians, but to Viceroy Linlithgow, Jinnah, and Savarkar.

From here on:

· Congress chances of total control were on a downward spiral, which increased their desperation and led to them sacrificing the motherland more and more.

· Jinnah set himself against the Congress and their ambition by wielding Islam as a very formidable weapon.

· Savarkar swooped upon the political field to rouse the Hindus into saving their motherland.

A vicious circle was formed: the more Congress aimed for control—greedily, the more Jinnah wielded the Islam weapon—successfully, the more Savarkar roused the Hindus—desperately. This led back to the Congress indulging in more scheming.

On an aside I have to say that the Congress misrepresented, misinterpreted, and misunderstood Savarkar’s bid to rouse the Hindus—who else was he going to rouse to save the Motherland but the national majority?—and till today continue the unjust maligning of his name.

What exactly did Congress, particularly Nehru, do to trigger this vicious circle?

“It was taken for granted both in the Report of the Simon Commission and the discussions in the Round Table Conference that the main communities, particularly the Muslims, ought to be, and in fact would be, represented in the Provincial Ministries. . . .”

Having made their bed of thorns by accepting, without a protest, the Communal Award, it was now incumbent upon the Congress to accept its dictates.

· But the Congress High Command ruling the Congress like a dictatorship, sought to govern the Provinces in the same manner!

To continue:

“But when the Congress decided to accept office there arose a strong difference between the two [Congress and League] . . . the Congress, in pursuance of their principle mentioned above [that in Congress Provinces the Ministers should be selected solely from the Congress Party,] offered to include the members of the Muslim League only on certain conditions which practically meant dissolution of the Muslim League and the incorporation of its members in the Congress organization . . .

These detailed terms only translated into practice the pithy saying attributed to Nehru that ‘there were only two parties in the country—the Congress and the British Government.’”

It was preposterously arrogant and short-sighted of the Congress to imagine that Jinnah and the Muslim League would meekly become Congress puppets . . . !

Throughout the rest of the history of the Freedom Movement, every move the Congress made was aimed at ensuring they were the only party to be given the opportunity to rule the roost.

· This was their guiding principle.

To continue:

“No wise statesman could seriously believe that the Muslim League would readily give up its own separate identity and merge itself in the Congress. The Muslim League refused to commit political Harikiri at the bidding of the Congress.”[1]

In addition to this, the Congress mass contact movement for the Muslims had a shocking approach—though one in keeping with their arrogant dictatorship.

“In effect, though not in actual words, it [Congress mass contact movement for the Muslims] amounted to an insidious propaganda of the following type: ‘Political power with all the patronage and influence it implied was exclusively in Congress hands, and there it would remain.

True to its principles, the Congress would not deny a fair share of its appointments from Minister’s office downwards to the Moslem minority, but it could not be expected to bestow them on any but the Congress Moslems. For a Moslem to stay in the League, therefore, was to condemn himself to a lifetime of wilderness. Let him make the other choice, and make it at once while the door was still open.’”[2]

This stung Jinnah into instant retaliation.

And Jinnah, the master politician, out-maneuvered the Congress High Command practically overnight . . . !

He laid down conditions for negotiations that cut at the very foundation upon which the Congress was based for the last so many years.

Let us see how by 1938, the situation had changed drastically.

· The Congress pride came before a great fall, indeed! And that at the hands of Jinnah.

“Jinnah took up the position that the condition precedent to all negotiations was a frank recognition of the Congress and the League as the only representative bodies, respectively, of the Hindus and Muslims of India.

The executive Committee of the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution to the effect that ‘it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat and negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the Musalmans of India.’

But this was not all. Jinnah made it clear in his letter to Subhas Bose, dated 2 August, 1938, that the committee appointed by the Congress to discuss the Hindu-Muslim questions should not include any Musalman. . . .

It is easy to see that the Congress could not accept these demands without stultifying its whole history as a national organization of Indians of all faith and communities.

The Congress demand in 1937 that the Muslims must liquidate the Muslim League if they wanted to share powers with the Congress was bad enough, but it was far worse to demand that the Indian National Congress, with its proud records of more than half a century’s service as a national organization, should voluntarily degrade itself into a communal Organization only to serve as a counterpart to the Muslim League.”[3]

Oh, how neatly Jinnah had turned the tables on the Congress!

Jinnah was turning out to be a serious problem for the Congress.

· And since the “bogey” Jinnah could not be made to go poof, the Congress sought to be rid of him through partition.

The axe ready to chop India had now made its grim appearance on the political scene!

Anurupa

[1] Ibid, 561

[2] HFMI, vol III, R. C. Majumdar, page 566.

[3] Ibid, 569

“Now, if at this moment the Muslims were fully assured that this sort of composite government would be formed at the centre, and that the Muslims in it would be real representatives of the Muslim community and not merely nominees of the Hindus, they would probably be satisfied. But owing to the recent conduct of the Congress they feel no such assurance. They believe that Congress’s aim is to establish Hindu Raj at the center . . . Congress policy has certainly created this impression. For after sweeping victories in the provincial elections, Congress proceeded to form pure Congress ministries in every Province. In none of them would they admit the principle of coalition. . . . It is pure Congress Raj . . .” Strangers in India, by Penderel Moon, I.C.S., page 106.

“When the Congress decided to accept office there was a proposal that it should form coalition ministries with the Muslim League. . . . The Congress decided to have homogeneous ministries of its own and chose Muslim ministers from amongst those who were members of the Congress Party. This was the beginning of a serious rift between the Congress and the League and was a factor which induced neutral Muslim opinion to turn to the support of Jinnah. . . .

Jinnah and the other leaders of the Muslim League, embittered by the controversy on the issue of coalition ministries, now began to play with the idea of a separate State, and turned against the conception of an all-India federation.” Transfer of Power, V. P. Menon, pages 56-57

The Seeds of Pakistan . . . !

Posted on by Anurupa

Mother India: “By the pricking of my thumbs,

Something wicked this way comes.”

Hi, Everyone! In 1937, the Congress came right out and revealed its goal of total control in the governing of India. They had the Hindus in their pocket, and were under the impression that the Muslims would also happily crawl in there. Well, they certainly had a rude awakening!

In his book, History of the Freedom Movement in India, vol. III (hence forth in all the posts to be called HFMI, vol. III) page 551-552, R. C. Majumdar, a noted historian, writes:

“The result of the elections held in 1937 belied the claims of both the Congress and the Muslim League. . . . It was a clear indication that the Congress organization had no contact with the Muslim masses and had very little influence over them. The Congress could not therefore advance any reasonable claim to represent the Muslims. . . .

It is not a little curious that the Muslim League had a specially bad record of election success in those Provinces like Bengal, the Punjab, Sindh and North-West Frontier Province where the Muslims formed the majority community, and fared much better in the Provinces which had a strong Hindu majority with a significant and vocal minority.”

[Point to note:

· the Muslims of the very provinces which went to Pakistan in 1947 had happily voted for nationalist Muslim parties in 1937. . . !

A Central Federation at this time would have bound them to a united India.]

“The reason is that the Muslim League had no special positive programme which distinguished it from the other parties and had no local influence in any Province. It throve only on its assumed character as a bulwark of defence against Hindu attack. The Provinces with a Muslim majority had no genuine fear of such an attack, and were not therefore susceptible to the propaganda of the League.

It is only when the Muslim masses learnt to look upon the problem from an all-India perspective that the Muslim League emerged as the most powerful Muslim organization. . . .

The credit of Jinnah lies in the fact that he succeeded in developing this political consciousness among the Muslims within an incredibly short time. . . .”

And to do that, he too brought religion into politics.

“He touched the chord of religious feelings of the Muslims which have always proved a potent factor in Muslim politics. ‘The Mullahs of the countryside were soon up in arms against the Congress propagandist . . .’ The Congress mass contact movement, which had made some headway, collapsed under the attack of the Mullahs.”[1]

To continue (HFMI, vol. III, page 551-552):

“The intransigence of the Congress high command helped its growth. They took their stand on the theory that the Congress represented the whole of India . . . They ignored the Muslim League as having no influence over the masses and only representing a ‘microscopic minority’ of the Muslims . . . But they discounted the idea that there may be a national urge among the Muslims limited to their own community . . . and though a nationalist may disapprove such a development, a Statesman can ignore it at his peril.

Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, among the Congress leaders must be held highly guilty in this respect. . . .

It [Congress] did not learn the obvious lesson of coming to terms with the Muslim League till by its [Congress’s] folly the League had attained a position when it could dictate its own terms, and demanded Pakistan as the only basis of settlement.”

This is how R. C. Majumdar wraps it up in a nutshell:

· “In 1937 his [Nehru’s] outright rejection of Jinnah’s offer of Congress-League Coalition Ministry ruined the last chance of a Hindu-Muslim agreement.”

So much for the much-touted Congress Hindu-Muslim unity demand of the Congress. . . !

· As I said, making a demand is one thing but without follow-up by action it is just so much hot air.

But what exactly was it that Congress and Nehru did?

Find out tomorrow!

Anurupa

[1] HIFM, vol III, R. C. Majumdar, page 568.